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THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN, 
CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE EMERGING 
 SHAPE OF A NEW WORLD TRADE 
REGULATORY ORDER   
LARRY CATÁ BACKER∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The role and shape of international trade agreements is changing. No 
longer simple devices for easing the movement of goods across borders, 
they are becoming both an instrument of integrated economic regulation 
at the supranational level and a tool of international relations within the 
emerging global economic order. The recently expanded scope of 
negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) serves as a case 
in point, one that focuses both on the trilateral relations between Japan, 
the United States, and China, and on the form of competition for control of 
the language of supranational economic regulation. The focus of this 
Article is on the decision by Japan to join the U.S.-led negotiations for a 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, even as it pushes ahead with a Free Trade 
Agreement with China and Korea. This decision represents a critical new 
aspect of Japanese trade relationships that is likely to have significant 
economic and geopolitical effects. I will first describe the TPP from its 
genesis as an effort by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore to 
better integrate their economic relationships into current efforts to create 
a powerful free trade area of the Pacific that excludes China. I will then 
elaborate on the central strategic considerations that follow from this 
important decision in the relationships between Japan, the United States, 
and China, with emphasis on the way in which this affects contests for 
control of international rulemaking within the structures of economic 
globalization. For Japan, the TPP may represent a means to use a 
necessary containment of its own policy autonomy within complex 
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networks of multilateral arrangements to protect its sizeable investment in 
China, at least temporarily, and to permit it to leverage its power to 
influence global trade rules. For the United States, the TPP presents an 
opportunity to leverage power as well, by creating an alternative to the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) for moving trade talks forward in 
ways that serve U.S. governance interests more comprehensively. For 
China, the TPP represents an additional layer of containment, meant to 
constrain its economic power and to limit the value of the country’s form 
of state capitalism. The TPP represents the next wave of plurilateral 
comprehensive agreements that will shape the framework of global 
economic governance. It also suggests the growing importance of 
international agreements as the space within which the structures of 
economic regulation will be determined, to the detriment of state power. 
Within these structures, the TPP also reaffirms that Japan stands 
uncomfortably close to the fissure that separates the United States from 
Chinese interests, and must continue to rely on the internationalization of 
rulemaking to protect its interests. An independent path for Japan is 
unlikely to be an option worth considering. 
INTRODUCTION 
International trade agreements were once the province of politics and 
only incidentally of interest to lawyers. These instruments have now 
evolved into increasingly important sources of rulemaking affecting both 
domestic and international legal orders.1 To that end, they are no longer 
treated as simple devices for easing the movement of goods across 
borders. Instead, trade agreements are increasingly considered instruments 
of integrated economic regulation at the supranational level and a tool of 
international relations within the emerging global economic order.2  
The recently expanded scope of negotiations over the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (“TPP”) serves as a case in point—one that focuses both on 
the trilateral relations between Japan, the United States, and China, and on 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2005) (evolution of trade agreements from essentially political to more regulatory); Patrick Specht, 
The Dispute Settlement Systems of WTO and NAFTA—Analysis and Comparison, 27 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 57 (1998). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen Joseph Powell & Ludmila Mendonça Lopes Ribeiro, Managing the Rule of 
Law in the Americas: An Empirical Portrait of the Effects of 15 Years of WTO, Mercosul, and NAFTA 
Dispute Resolution on Civil Society in Latin America, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 198 
(2011) (trade dispute settlement contributes to the management and perfection of the rule of law in 
support of democratic governance for civil societies in Latin America). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/6
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the form of competition for control of the language of supranational 
economic regulation. The relationship between Japan and China remains 
complex and antagonistically competitive.3 History both joins and divides 
them.4 The specter of the century before 19495 in their relations continues 
to affect elite and popular perceptions in ways that sometimes drive policy 
and culture. The October 2012 anti-Japanese riots in China were the first 
significant expressions of anti-Japanese popular opinion since 2005. The 
riots demonstrated the way in which passions, both managed and 
unmanaged, can be inflamed.6 Indeed, popular sentiment has become a 
critical factor driving those relations.7 The Japanese have not been passive 
either. After the October riots the Japanese press countered with the 
suggestion of a mass pull out of Japanese investment in China.8 
Currently, that cooperative and sometimes antagonistic relationship is 
making itself felt in two important respects. The first is in territorial claims 
of the two states, especially with respect to the Senkaku Islands (known to 
the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands). The second, to some extent tied to the 
first, are the efforts to control or at least influence the structures of trade in 
the Pacific region, efforts pushed into high gear with the election of Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe. The two are linked from the Japanese and Chinese 
 
 
 3. For current thinking in the popular press, see, e.g., Gideon Rachman, The Shadow of 1914 
Falls Over the Pacific, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e29e200a-6ebb-
11e2-9ded-00144feab49a.html#axzz2OBoyj8tY (“US is concerned that the new Japanese cabinet is 
full of hardline nationalists, who are more inclined to confront China. Shinzo Abe, the new Japanese 
prime minister, is the grandson of a wartime cabinet minister and rejects the ‘apology diplomacy,’ 
through which Japan tried to atone for the war. . . . The Chinese military is also increasingly influential 
in shaping foreign policy.”). 
 4. See, e.g., RICHARD C. BUSH, THE PERILS OF PROXIMITY: CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY 
RELATIONS (2010). 
 5. See, e.g., RICHARD J. SAMUELS, SECURING JAPAN: TOKYO’S GRAND STRATEGY AND THE 
FUTURE OF EAST ASIA (2011); JOHN DEWEY, CHINA, JAPAN AND THE U.S.A.: PRESENT CONDITIONS 
IN THE FAR EAST AND THEIR BEARING ON THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE (1921).  
 6. Rattling the Supply Chains, ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
business/21564891-businesses-struggle-contain-fallout-diplomatic-crisis.  
 7. Nozomu Hayashi, the Beijing Bureau correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun, noted:  
Small anti-Japan rallies, which started near the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and elsewhere, 
spread to many places across the country toward the weekend. CCTV kept fanning anti-
Japanese sentiments. 
 A retired official from China’s Foreign Ministry said that anti-Japan rallies, which he 
said was ignited by Japan’s actions, were not the same as those in the past. 
 “If the Chinese government stopped the Hong Kong activists, the people’s criticism 
would have quickly turned toward the central government,” the former official said. “Anti-
Japan sentiments, which began after (Tokyo Governor Shintaro) Ishihara’s announcement of 
a plan to purchase the islands, reached a different level from those in the past.” 
Nozomu Hayashi, @Beijing: Why Have China’s Anti-Japan Sentiments Heightened?, ASAHI SHIMBUN 
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/column/AJ201210250004.  
 8. Rattling the Supply Chains, supra note 6.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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perspectives. In an editorial published for English-speaking readers in the 
People’s Daily in January 2013, Chinese authorities made it clear that they 
view Japanese economic and diplomatic policies as aimed potentially to 
further a strategy of encircling and containing Chinese economic 
ambitions and territorial claims.9  
Indeed, Shinzo Abe himself has described Japan’s policies so as to 
corroborate these concerns. During an address to the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (“CSIS”) on February 22, 2013, Prime Minister 
Abe explained where he thought Japan should stand in the future by 
referencing three principal tasks it faced: 
Firstly, when the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific region becomes 
more and more prosperous, Japan must remain a leading promoter 
of rules. By rules, I mean those for trade, investment, intellectual 
property, labor, environment and the like. Secondly, Japan must 
continue to be a guardian of the global commons, like the maritime 
commons, open enough to benefit everyone. Japan's aspirations 
being such, thirdly, Japan must work even more closely with the 
United States, Korea, Australia and other like-minded democracies 
throughout the region.10 
According to the Prime Minister, the most effective use of Japanese power 
was on rules promotion, guardianship of open seas and other global 
common spaces, and for Japan to serve as an active partner of democratic 
states in the Pacific region.11 This approach to successful assertion of 
Japanese power was echoed recently by Foreign Affairs Minister Fumio 
Kishida’s speech to the 183rd Session of the Diet in which he identified 
the three pillars of Japanese foreign policy as “strengthening the Japan-
U.S. Alliance, deepening our cooperative relations with neighboring 
 
 
 9. Editorial, Encircling China Just Japan’s Wishful Thinking, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Jan. 
17, 2013), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8095303.html. The editorial stated: 
 The Japanese media have described the Abe administration’s diplomatic moves as new 
attempts to contain and encircle China. 
 It is fine if Japan’s “strategic diplomacy” is simply aimed at improving its relations with 
the above countries, promoting its foreign trade and investment, creating favorable external 
conditions for domestic economic recovery, and enhancing its international status and clout. 
 Japan will be disappointed if it really hopes to work with the above countries to contain, 
isolate, and encircle China through “strategic diplomacy,” and gain a strategic advantage over 
China in the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands.  
Id. 
 10. Shinzo Abe, Japan is Back, Speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) (Feb. 22, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130 
222en.html).  
 11. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/6
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countries, and strengthening economic diplomacy as a means to promoting 
the revitalization of the Japanese economy.”12 
Japan is pushing ahead with a Free Trade Agreement with China and 
Korea,13 but has also decided to join the U.S.-led negotiations for a Trans-
Pacific Partnership (“TPP”).14  This decision presents a new aspect of 
Japanese trade relationships that is likely to have significant economic and 
geopolitical effects. I will first describe the TPP from its genesis as an 
effort by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore to better integrate 
their economic relationships into current efforts to create a powerful free 
trade area of the Pacific that excludes China. I will then suggest some 
important strategic considerations that may follow from this important 
decision in the relationships between Japan, the United States, and China, 
with emphasis on the way in which this affects contests for control of 
international rulemaking within the structures of economic globalization.  
I. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
The TPP has evolved from a modest effort to secure regionalized trade 
into a politically criticized grasp for economic regulatory power. 
Originally the TPP represented efforts of a few Pacific Basin states—
Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore—to develop a modest 
framework for trade liberalization in the shadow of larger Asia-Pacific 
multilateral trade organizations. Originally known as the Pacific Three 
Closer Economic Partnership (“PO3-CEP”), negotiations commenced in 
2002 in the shadow of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) 
forum.15  It was signed in 2005 as a free trade-type agreement among these 
states. The United States was not invited to TPP talks until 2008. By 2011, 
TPP had grown to nine—Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States.16 It has been 
 
 
 12. Fumio Kishida, Foreign Policy Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida to the 
183rd Session of the Diet (Feb. 28, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ 
fm/kishida/speech_130228.html).  
 13. See, e.g., Joint Declaration on the Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehensive Cooperative 
Partnership, China-S. Kor.-Japan, May 13, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit 
1205/joint_declaration_en.html; Press Release, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Preparatory 
Meetings for the Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among Japan, China and the ROK 
(Feb. 21, 2013) (available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2013/2/0221_01.html).  
 14. See, e.g., Joshua Meltzer, Japan Joins the Trans Pacific Partnership—Finally!, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/03/18-japan-joins-trans-
pacific-partnership-meltzer.  
 15. For a history of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”), see History, APEC, 
http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/History.aspx.  
 16. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., THE UNITED STATES IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reported in influential outlets of the European press that “[m]any believe 
that other members of the APEC bloc may also join the agreement in the 
coming years, making it an even more important pact.”17 
TPP has three principal objectives: increasing markets for exports, 
providing a basis for broad Asia-Pacific regional economic integration, 
and increasing the competitiveness of the participating states.18 There are 
five key features that the U.S. Trade Representative suggested “will make 
TPP a landmark, 21st-century trade agreement, setting a new standard for 
global trade and incorporating next-generation issues that will boost the 
competitiveness of TPP countries in the global economy.”19 These include, 
first, the provision of comprehensive market access by eliminating tariffs 
and other barriers to trade. Second, TPP will be structured to make 
possible full regionalization that embeds within it the development of 
production and supply chains among TPP members. Third, TPP focuses 
on inter-agreement coherence. This requires integrating work done 
through APEC with a focus on regulatory coherence, enhancing 
competitiveness, a focus on small business (thus the reference to supply 
chains), and market liberalization. Fourthly, TPP would help develop trade 
in emerging technologies, including digital and green technologies. Lastly, 
TPP is designed to be a so-called “living agreement.”20 Like the WTO (but 
ideally more successful), it is meant to remain a work in progress.21 The 
scope of TPP is also meant to be fairly comprehensive.22  
 
 
(Nov. 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/ 
united-states-trans-pacific-partnership.  
 17. TPP: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.co 
.uk/news/business-21782080.  
 18. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 16.  
 19. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ENHANCING TRADE AND INVESTMENT, SUPPORTING JOBS, 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: OUTLINES OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/ 
november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement.  
 20. Id. The living agreement aspect of TPP might be attacked as not very sensible, precisely 
because it would require a mechanism either for constant renegotiation for the development of a 
supranational legislative apparatus to deal with changes in trade and economic activities. It is likely 
that any sort of structure that might explicitly cede governance authority out of the United States might 
raise opposition and be attacked as anti-democratic. The living agreement aspect of TPP might well 
also require an institutional infrastructure to make it work. That may be a tall order. The creation and 
deployment of a Secretariat structure, especially one with potentially important remediation structures, 
like ICSID, may be difficult to sell to Congress or to the United States’ partner states. Yet 
MERCOSUR has suggested that even an agreement with strong inter-governmental character can 
sustain a useful secretariat structure. See, e.g., LUIZ OLAVO BAPTISTA, FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS, MERCOSUR, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND JURIDICAL STRUCTURE (1998), available at 
http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/south/mstit2_e.pdf.  
 21. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 19.  
 22. Id. Issues covered include (1) regulation of competition (antitrust) issues, (2) cooperation and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/6
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TPP is still very much a work in progress.23 The Sixteenth Round of 
TPP talks were held in Singapore from March 4–13, 2013,24 and the 
Seventeenth Round was held from May 15–24 in Lima, Peru.25 One of the 
principal objectives was the integration of Japan into the talks. There was 
also a nod toward stakeholder engagement.26 Yet the way this engagement 
was described was curious indeed: the U.S. Trade Representative 
described the event as causing the temporary suspension of the negotiation 
“so negotiators could meet with the 300 stakeholders from the United 
States and other TPP countries.”27 The Eighteenth Round of negotiations 
 
 
capacity building (based on a demand driven and flexible institutional mechanism), (3) cross border 
services (fair open and transparent markets for services), (4) customs, (5) e-commerce, 
(6) environmental issues (including effective provisions on trade-related issues that would help to 
reinforce environmental protection and discussing an effective institutional arrangement to oversee 
implementation and a specific cooperation framework for addressing capacity building needs), 
(7) financial services regulation (investment in financial institutions and cross-border trade in financial 
services will improve transparency, non-discrimination, fair treatment of new financial services, and 
investment protections and an effective dispute settlement remedy for those protections), 
(8) government procurement, (9) intellectual property (reinforcing and developing existing World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) rights and 
obligations), (10) investment (transforming bi-lateral trade agreement terms into a multilateral 
framework, substantive legal protections for investors and investments of each TPP country in the 
other TPP countries, including ongoing negotiations on provisions to ensure non-discrimination, a 
minimum standard of treatment, rules on expropriation, and prohibitions on specified performance 
requirements that distort trade and investment), (11) labor issues, (12) legal issues (dispute resolution), 
(13) market access for goods, (14) rules of origin, (15) sanitary and phytosanitary standards (animal 
and plant health and food safety), (16) technical barriers to trade issues, (17) telecommunications, 
(18) temporary entry, (19) textiles and apparel, and (20) trade remedies. Id.  
 23. Summaries of earlier rounds of TPP negotiations may be found on the blog at the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative web site. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., TPP Blog, U.S. TRADE REP., 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-outreach-
and-updates (last updated Jan. 15, 2014).  
 24. These continued a pattern of very well managed stakeholder engagement events designed for 
maximum formal effect and unknown functional effect. These are organized as pauses from 
negotiations with several hundred civil society representatives. For the Singapore Round, “[t]he 
negotiators also had the opportunity to listen to [sixty] lecture-style stakeholder presentations.” Office 
of the U.S. Trade Rep., Direct Stakeholder Engagement, U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/direct-stakholder-engagement (last updated 
Feb. 25, 2014).  
 25. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations 
Maintain Strong Momentum (May 24, 2013) (available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/2013/may/tpp-negotiations-strong-momentum).  “During the 17th round of 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which ended today, officials reported that they continued 
to forge ahead toward their goal of concluding an ambitious 21st-century agreement in the timeframe 
envisioned by President Obama and the Leaders of the other ten TPP countries.” Id.  
 26. Id. This stakeholder intervention did not produce much engagement. Stakeholders appear to 
have been given the opportunity to present their views and in turn “Barbara Weisel, U.S. chief TPP 
negotiator, and the chief negotiators from the other 10 countries also briefed stakeholders on the status 
of the negotiations and responded to their questions on specific issues and the process going forward.” 
Id. 
 27. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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took place July 15–25, 2013, in Malaysia.28 For this round, “the 
negotiating groups covering market access, rules of origin, technical 
barriers to trade, investment, financial services, e-commerce, and 
transparency reached agreement on a wide range of technical issues in the 
legal texts of these chapters, which set the rules that govern the conduct of 
their trade and investment relations.”29 Like the Seventeenth Round, the 
Eighteenth Round followed the pattern of breaking for a short time to 
ingest a well-managed stakeholder interaction session.30 There is no 
evidence, however, that these highly publicized and well-arranged affairs 
have produced any sort of effective or deep engagement with the civil 
society sector.31 The Nineteenth Round took place from August 22–30, 
2013. A Ministerial Statement was released on August 23, 2013.32 In it, 
the parties expressed their intent to move toward final round talks.33 The 
Ministerial Statement also noted that “[p]articular areas of focus have 
included matters related to market access for goods, services-investment, 
financial services, and government procurement as well as the texts 
 
 
 28. Press Release, Office of the U.S Trade Rep., Statement on the 18th Round of Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Negotiations (July 25, 2013) (available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2013/july/statement-18th-round-tpp).  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. This was described in language almost identical to the form language used to describe the 
Seventeenth Round engagement:  
 The TPP negotiations were temporarily adjourned on July 20 so the delegates could listen 
to and share information with more than 200 stakeholders from the United States and across 
the TPP region. Stakeholders also met informally with U.S. and other negotiators to provide 
further detailed information. U.S. chief negotiator Barbara Weisel and her fellow TPP chief 
negotiators also briefed stakeholders on the status of the negotiations and responded to their 
questions on specific issues and the process going forward. 
Id. For this session, 180 parties had registered, including 51 from Malaysia, who would be given one 
half day “to present their views and concerns.” S.B. Toh, MITI: 180 Stakeholders to Present Views at 
Trans Pacific Partnership Talks, STAR ONLINE (Malaysia) (July 10, 2013), http://www.thestar.com.my 
/Business/Business-News/2013/07/10/MITI-says-stakeholders-to-present-views-at-Trans-Pacific-
Partnership-talks.aspx.  
 31. See discussion infra notes 62 and 105 and accompanying text, noting continuous criticism 
about negotiation and drafting secrecy.  
 32. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Joint Press Statement TPP Ministerial Meeting 
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam (Aug. 2013) (available at http://www.ustr.gov/Joint-Press-
Statement-TPP-Ministerial-Brunei).  
 33. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. It was reported that Burham Irwan Cheong, lead IP 
negotiator for the Malaysian TPP team, said that “of the 29 chapters under negotiation, 14 have been 
‘substantively concluded’ and their technical aspects agreed upon. The ‘sensitive’ issues as well as the 
remaining 15 or so chapters have yet to see substantive agreement and conclusion, with the IP Rights 
chapter being one of them.” Gabey Goh, IP Rights Chapter of TPP Far from Final, Says Ministry, 
MALAY MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.themalaymailonline.com/tech-gadgets/article/ip-
rights-chapter-of-tpp-far-from-final-says-ministry.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN, CHINA, & THE U.S. 57 
 
 
 
 
covering intellectual property, competition, and environmental issues.”34 
The purpose of this Ministerial meeting was “to offer guidance to 
negotiators and help drive the negotiations to conclusion on the 2013 
timeframe instructed by our Leaders.”35 For this event, the “Government 
of Brunei host[ed] a Stakeholders’ Forum on August 27, 2013, at the 
International Convention Centre.”36 However, civil society actors 
complained that the now traditional “stakeholder engagement day” was 
reduced in scope from that held in past TPP Rounds.37 Beyond the 
Nineteenth Round, the TPP parties expected “to maintain our active 
engagement in the lead-up to the APEC Leaders meeting in Bali, 
Indonesia, on the margins of which TPP Leaders are expected to meet . . . . 
This meeting will be an important milestone as the 12 countries work 
intensively to conclude this landmark agreement.”38  However, by the end 
of the Nineteenth Round negotiations, several states leaked reports of 
“turbulence amid protectionist reflexes, casting doubt on hopes of 
concluding the pact by year-end.”39 
The United States’ entry into TPP has not gone without controversy in 
the United States. For example, one commentator noted that “[f]or import-
sensitive US sectors, Japan’s participation in the TPP also could mean 
increased competition from Japanese products including in certain 
agriculture sectors and in the US auto and auto parts sector.”40 Some civil 
society organizations suggest that the TPP project itself continues the 
 
 
 34. “We also discussed the remaining outstanding issues on labor, dispute settlement, and other 
areas.” Office of the U.S. Trade Rep, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): 19th Round of Negotiations 
Set for Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei—August 23–30, 2013, U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/ 
tpp (last visited Aug. 30, 2013).  
 37. Krista Cox, 19th Round of TPP Negotiations: Reduced Engagement for ‘Stakeholder 
Engagement’ Day, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 27, 2013), http://keionline.org/ node/1791 
(“Usually, these days involve presentations by stakeholders to negotiators followed shortly by an hour 
long briefing by chief negotiators. . . . This round, there was no briefing from the chief negotiators. I 
find this quite appalling, particularly in light of the rumors that this will be the last official round of 
negotiations and all work moving forward will simply be meetings of individual chapters and that we 
may not see chief negotiators at intersessionals.”).   
 38. U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 32. 
 39. TPP Negotiators Finish ‘Difficult’ Round of Talks, JAPAN TODAY (Aug. 31, 2013), 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/tpp-negotiators-finish-difficult-round-of-talks (“‘I 
don’t think it is a realistic timeline,’ the Malaysian official said, adding that the country’s government 
was yet to decide whether it would ultimately remain in the effort. ‘We have reached a critical stage. 
So now we need to assess, to take stock—what if we continue, what if we don’t.’”). 
 40. Jay L. Eizenstat, Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, Japan’s Entry Into Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Raises Opportunities and Risks for US Companies,  NAT’L 
L. REV. (Mar. 31, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/japan-s-entry-trans-pacific-partnership-
free-trade-agreement-fta-raises-opportunitie.  
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process of power shifting from out of nation states and into a politically 
unaccountable international sector,41 and in the process further undermines 
democratic values and national supremacy.42  
It is certainly true that the TPP will accelerate trends, now almost a 
generation old, that are shifting the frame of power reference up from the 
people of states safely contained within their borders to the communities 
of states in which states begin to assume the role that individuals once 
were said to hold within democratic states. That is a cause of great worry 
among those who seek to resist this trend at the heart of economic 
globalization.43 Indeed, opponents use the language of sovereignty, and 
appeal to its preservation, to rally opposition to what they believe will 
effectively be the internationalization of law frameworks. This attack on 
state sovereignty through a TPP framework will not only reduce the 
connection between people and accountable governments, but it will also 
weaken connections between inferior governments and the now 
internationalized sources of rules.44 This line of opposition is current not 
just in the United States.45  
 
 
 41. For example, members of participating civil society organizations have complained:  
On critical issues, the massive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) being negotiated in secret by 
the Obama administration will undermine democracy in the United States and around the 
world and further empower transnational corporations. It will circumvent protections for 
health care, wages, labor rights, consumers’ rights and the environment, and decrease 
regulation of big finance and risky investment practices.  
Margaret Flowers & Kevin Zeese, TransPacific Partnership Will Undermine Democracy, Empower 
Transnational Corporations, PEOPLE’S VOICE (Mar. 31, 2013), http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/ 
Voices.php/2013/03/31/transpacific-partnership-will-undermine-.  
 42. “The only way this treaty, which will be very unpopular with the American people once they 
are aware of it, can be approved is if the Obama administration avoids the democratic process by using 
an authority known as ‘Fast Track,’ which limits the constitutional checks and balances of Congress.” 
Id. 
 43. The reactions are usually framed in the traditional language of sovereignty, though it is not 
clear that these critics understand the full extent of the power transfers being effected. “The trade deal 
is essentially the kill shot for what remains of legal democratic accountability in the United States and 
will allow the rootless global elite and their transnational corporations to dictate the daily lives and 
laws of the American people.” D.S. Wright, Trans-Pacific Partnership Will Remove What’s Left of 
American Democracy, FDL (Aug. 20, 2013), http://news.firedoglake.com/2013/08/20/trans-pacific-
partnership-will-remove-whats-left-of-american-democracy/. This, I think, nicely evidences the form 
of current disquiet but it does not accurately describe it. Democracy is not so much being threatened as 
the connection between sovereign people in states and the sites where governance is occurring is being 
attenuated.  
 44. For an example, see Jane Slaughter, TPP Free Trade Deal Threatens Democracy, Jobs, 
GREEN LEFT WEEKLY (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/54739.  
 45. TPP Gets Hostile Response During Public Meeting, STAR ONLINE (Malaysia) (Aug. 2, 
2013), http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2013/08/02/Consumers-laud-move-to-block-stolen-
handphones.aspx/.  
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The TPP has been criticized as a vehicle for undermining efforts to 
revive and push forward the WTO agenda, substantially stalled since 
2008. For example, it has been argued that “[t]he main responsibility for 
this failure falls on the US, which believes the system of multilateral trade 
no longer offers the advantages it used to.”46 The United States now 
appears poised to fracture the WTO model in favor of regionally specific 
but more comprehensive agreements that together might provide a 
substitute for WTO multilateralism. This shift in U.S. policy was 
emphasized in President Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address, where 
the President highlighted the new policy focus on regional but 
comprehensive trade agreements.47 TPP, and the related Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership for Europe,48 represents an alternative 
track for the development of the governance framework for international 
trade, one in which smaller groups of individual states combine to forge 
common language that include harmonized general principles along with 
specific provisions to reflect the priorities of the member states.49 These 
provide a plurilateral template for continuing to move forward the work of 
the WTO among powerful like-minded states even as the multilateral 
processes of the WTO prove difficult to engage. For some, this suggests 
the end of the WTO as the vessel for developing the rules of global 
engagement in favor of smaller groups of states that together would 
produce a layered substitute for the WTO process. “If the TPP or TTIP 
 
 
 46. Zaki Laïdi, Opinion, Trade Deal Show Power Politics is Back, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e2aae9f4-9254-11e2-851f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2PGbI4Atv.  
 47. President Obama said:  
To boost American exports, support American jobs, and level the playing field in the growing 
markets of Asia, we intend to complete negotiations on a Trans-Pacific Partnership. And 
tonight, I’m announcing that we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership with the European Union, because trade that is fair and free across the 
Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs. 
Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013) (transcript 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-
barack-obama). 
 48. See Final Report of the United States-European Union High Level Working Group on Jobs 
and Growth, at 6 (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/ 
tradoc_150519.pdf (“the HLWG recommends to U.S. and EU Leaders that the United States and the 
EU launch, in accordance with their respective domestic procedures, negotiations on a comprehensive, 
ambitious agreement that addresses a broad range of bilateral trade and investment issues, including 
regulatory issues, and contributes to the development of global rules.”). 
 49. See the useful discussion in FAQ: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
MARIETJE SCHAAKE (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.marietjeschaake.eu/2013/06/faq-transatlantic-trade-
and-investment-partnership-ttip/  (“From a global perspective a renewed transatlantic partnership 
would be able to set standards for future world trade—and it would be an incentive for (re)emerging 
economies or developing countries to step up their game, improve their competitiveness and prosperity 
by opening up markets and working towards meeting the new TTIP global standards.”).  
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come into being, they will kill the WTO. For better or for worse, the 
organisation will cease to be the place where trade standards are 
negotiated.”50 
The TPP process has also been criticized for being among the most 
opaque in the international arena.51 The lack of transparency has been 
particularly annoying to the critics of the TPP process because of the way 
it has deviated from the usual pattern of permitting a lively engagement by 
civil society. The Sixteenth Round, for instance, included a very limited 
space for stakeholder engagement.52 The U.S. Trade Representative’s blog 
and related postings tend to be generally descriptive of events with 
considerably limited substantive information.53 Others have suggested that 
even where the U.S. government has established processes of 
“engagement,” these have tended to favor business interests.54  
A group of international law professors severely criticized the 
negotiation process. They argued that the “functional and theoretical 
impact of the lack of transparency and accountability in the TPP and other 
trade negotiations institutionalizes the kind of process that the late Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan criticized as policy making through ‘ignorant 
 
 
 50. Laïdi, supra note 46. 
 51. Sean Flynn, Law Professors Call for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Transparency, 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (May 9, 2012), http://infojustice.org/archives/21137.  
Over 30 legal academics from current or potential future Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) negotiating countries wrote to United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk 
today. The letter, the text of which is posted below, criticizes the USTR decision to cancel 
full day stakeholder presentations for the current round of negotiations being held in Dallas, 
Texas. The letter calls on the administration to “reverse course” and work to expand 
participation and transparency by giving the general public the same rights to see US 
proposals in the negotiation as cleared corporate advisers now have. 
Id. 
 52. As described by the U.S. Trade Representative on his website,  
On Wednesday, March 6, negotiators from the 11 Trans-Pacific Partnership Countries paused 
talks to meet with more than 300 global stakeholders at an engagement event hosted by the 
Government of Singapore. . . . Following the 3 hour engagement event, the TPP chief 
negotiators convened a stakeholder briefing session at which they provided updates on the 
ongoing negotiations and answered questions related to the subject matter of the proposed 
agreement.  
Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 24. The United States also keeps a web page for posting 
public comments—the effect of which is unclear. See Comments on “Trans Pacific Partnership,” 
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (search “Trans Pacific Partnership”; then filter for 
“Public Submission”). 
 53. See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 23. 
 54. This engagement through advisory committees, it has been suggested, has been structured to 
amplify business’ voice. “The advisory committees within the United States Trade Representative are 
part of a three-level structure. Privileged corporate interests dominate both the first level and the 
crucial third level.” Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Free Trade Disagreement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/opinion/edsall-free-trade-disagreement.html?_r=0.  
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armies clash[ing] by night.’”55 The professors also called for greater and 
timelier information sharing.56 A similar letter was delivered by elements 
of Peruvian civil society to the Peruvian Minister of External Commerce.57 
These criticisms are particularly trenchant since the way in which TPP is 
being negotiated appears to run counter to one of its core objectives—to 
spread democratic-based processes for engaging in regulatory programs.   
That contradiction between TPP development and objective might 
itself produce political backlash at home.58 One can get a sense of the form 
of this backlash by some of the reactions of U.S. elected officials. For 
example, Representative Darrell Issa (Republican from California) and 
Senator Ron Wyden (Democrat from Oregon) recently repeated these 
criticisms.59 Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat from Massachusetts) has 
sought the bracketed text of the TPP in June 2013 in a letter that criticized 
the lack of transparency that has marked the progress of negotiation.60  
Criticism along these lines continues, and not just in the United States. 
The Council of Canadians, one of Canada’s largest citizens’ organizations, 
led a charge to compel greater transparency in TPP negotiations in late 
August 2013. Particularly galling for NGOs is that despite the state-
managed stakeholder engagements of 2013,61 the evolving text of the TPP 
 
 
 55. Flynn, supra note 51.   
 56. Id. 
 57. Letter from Roberto López et al. to José Luis Silva Martinot, Minister of Foreign Commerce 
of Peru, (Oct. 14 2011) (available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/peru-transparency-letter-
2011.pdf).  
 58. Letter from David S. Levine et al. to Ambassador Ron Kirk (May 9, 2012), quoted in Flynn, 
supra note 51.   
There has been no publicly released text of what USTR is demanding in these negotiations, as 
there would be in policy making by regulation, in Congress or in multilateral forums. 
Reviews of leaked proposals show that the US is pushing numerous standards that are beyond 
those included in any past (i.e. publicly released) agreement and that could require changes in 
current US statutory law. 
Id. 
 59. Joe Wolverton II, U.S. Lawmakers Demand Transparency in Secret Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Talks, NEW AM. (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/item/12838-
us-lawmakers-demand-transparency-in-secret-trans-pacific-partnership-talks.  
 60. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, to Michael Froman, Asst. to the President (June 
13, 2013) (available  at http://images.politico.com/global/2013/06/12/ew_ltr_to_froman_61313.html). 
A similar letter was sent to Sander Levin, Ranking Member of the U.S. House Ways and Means 
Committee, by a group of 35 Congresspersons. See Letter from Mark Pocan et al., Congresspersons, to 
Sander Levin, Ranking Member, U.S. House Ways & Means Comm. (June 11, 2013) (available at 
http://pocan.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/pocan-calls-for-increased-transparency-on-trans-
pacific-partnership-free).  
 61. See supra note 25  (discussing stakeholder engagement during the Seventeenth Round).  
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has yet to be made public.62 These groups remind current leaders of Robert 
Zoelleck, who, in 2001 during his time as U.S. Trade Representative, 
noted that releasing the text of the draft of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas constituted “an unprecedented effort to make international trade 
and its economic and social benefits more understandable to the public.”63 
Since at least the middle of 2013, the negotiators have sought to suggest 
that stakeholder voices have meant something to the negotiations.64 The 
well staged shareholder engagement feature of the TPP process has also 
been criticized as hiding more than it reveals and, more significantly, as a 
vehicle through which transparency is limited to pre-cleared civil society 
actors acceptable to the negotiating governments.65 Elected officials 
continue to find it difficult to obtain much information from 
administration officials, even in the United States.66 In 2012 one group 
sought to offer a reward to WikiLeaks should it leak the document.67 
 
 
 62. Council of Canadians, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Canadian Groups Demand End to 
Secrecy, COUNCIL OF CANADIANS’ BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013), http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/council-
canadians/2013/08/trans-pacific-partnership-canadian-groups-demand-end-to-sec.  They explain: 
“It is a scandal that a far-reaching deal like the TPP could be signed in the coming months 
without anyone across the 12 participating countries having seen or had a chance to challenge 
some of the many new restrictions an agreement will put on our ability to govern in the public 
interest. The only acceptable road forward for the TPP is for ministers to publish the text now 
before it’s too late,” says Stuart Trew, trade campaigner with the Council of Canadians, a 
national grassroots activist and social justice organization. 
Id. The Canadian government had conducted what was, for that government, a comprehensive 
consultation process in December 2011. See Trans Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement 
Negotiations, FOREIGN AFF., TRADE & DEV. CAN. (Aug. 2013), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/index.aspx.  
 63. Council of Canadians, supra note 62. 
 64. “Throughout the talks, negotiators reflected the wide range of views provided to them by 
their stakeholders on the best pathway to promote trade and investment, regional integration, and jobs 
in the United States and the other TPP countries.” Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 28.  
 65. William F. Jasper, Regional Scheme for the Pacific Rim, NEW AM. (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/item/16347-regional-scheme-for-the-pacific-rim.  
The USTR “Fact Sheet” cites as evidence of its transparency efforts the number of 
consultations it has held with its selected trade advisory committees and privileged “Civil 
Society stakeholders.”. . . This transparency boast actually exposes a dangerous feature of the 
TPP process: The TPP documents are not available to the average American citizen, only to 
“cleared trade advisors.” 
Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Just Foreign Policy, Wikileaks, We Have a Job for You, http://org.salsalabs.com/o/ 
1439/content_item/freetpp (last updated 2013). “On 13 November 2013 WikiLeaks released the draft 
text of the crucial Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) Intellectual Property chapter during the 
lead-up to a TPP chief negotiators’ meeting in Salt Lake City on 19-24 November 2013. Today, 9 
December 2013, WikiLeaks has released two more secret TPP documents that show the state of 
negotiations as the twelve TPP countries began supposedly final negotiations at a trade ministers’ 
meeting in Singapore this week.” Second Release of Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN, CHINA, & THE U.S. 63 
 
 
 
 
Despite the criticism, high governmental officials continue to view TPP 
as a socio-political tool with a value beyond its important objective of 
regulating economic globalization.68 President Obama has said, “the TPP 
could serve as a model for other trade pacts,” but he did not provide 
further details.69 A cornerstone of the Obama Administration’s policy is to 
use agreements like TPP as a “component of an integrated approach to 
development policy.”70 But the critics of the Obama Administration’s 
approach understand the breadth of TPP correctly as a “super-sized” next 
generation trade deal that is meant to institutionalize current developments 
in free movement of goods, services and capital, and to some extent, 
labor.71 Not merely limited to the usual provisions of trade deals, this one 
is meant to provide a basis for pushing forward the work of the World 
Trade Organization, but now in reduced multilateral form. To that end, it 
serves to regulate transnational economic activity in a way that is 
essentially regulatory. Moreover, because of the economic power of its 
participants, the TPP will likely serve as an instrument for effectively 
coercing compliance among other actors. It falls within the larger U.S., 
and, to some extent, Japanese agendas of creating increasingly larger 
multilateral webs of free trade areas, some not yet successful,72 that can 
serve as the basis of regulatory systems for integrating economic activities 
among member states. TPP means to set the social, political, and 
economic tone of the conversation about the methods and values of 
transnational economic activity.73 As such, it represents global regulatory 
 
 
Documents, WIKILEAKS (Dec. 9, 2013, 2:40 GMT), https://wikileaks.org/Second-release-of-secret-
Trans.html.  
 68. See usefully Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in 
Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011).  
 69. Obama Outlines Pan-Pacific Trade Plan at APEC Summit, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15704358.  
 70. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., NEW U.S. INITIATIVES TO BOOST TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/new-us-initiatives-boost-trade-and-investment-opportunities-l.  
 71. Raul Burbano, Kristen Beifus & Manuel Pérez-Rocha, Facing the Threat of the Trans-
Pacific Treaty, TYEE (Mar. 8 2013), http://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2013/03/08/Trans-Pacific-Treaty-
Threat/.  
 72. The stalled efforts to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas provides a case in point. See, 
e.g., J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20864, A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS: 
MAJOR POLICY ISSUES AND STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/row/RS20864.pdf. See also Larry Catá Backer, ALBA, Latin American Integration, and the 
Construction of Regional Political Power, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 6, 2010), 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/alba-latin-american-integration-and.html.  
 73. As its opponents correctly note: 
Only five of the TPP’s 29 chapters pertain to traditional trade matters. The rest would set 
policies, to which the U.S. Congress and state legislatures would be required to conform, 
relating to regulation of energy and other services, financial regulation, food safety, 
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power in its current form. For states, it represents a means of leveraging 
power and participating in emerging global conversations about the 
structures of acceptable behavior in ways that are difficult to ignore.  
On March 15, 2013, Prime Minister Abe, in what was described as an 
impassioned televised address, announced that Japan would join the 
TPP.74 He argued that TPP is “Japan’s last chance to remain an economic 
power in Asia and shape the region’s future.”75 Despite the expected 
opposition from the farming sector, the Japanese Prime Minister 
emphasized his determination to enhance Japanese influence in the region. 
“Japan must remain at the center of the Asian-Pacific century,” Mr. Abe 
said. “If Japan alone continues to look inward, we will have no hope for 
growth. This is our last chance. If we don’t seize it, Japan will be left 
out.”76 Acting U.S. Trade Representative Demetrios Maranatis 
immediately welcomed the announcement, noting that “[s]ince early last 
year, the United States has been engaged with Japan in bilateral TPP 
consultations on issues of concern with respect to the automotive and 
insurance sectors and other non-tariff measures, and also conducting work 
regarding meeting TPP’s high standards.”77  
Initial reaction among the Japanese was cautiously positive, with an 
Asahi Shimbun poll indicating 71% favoring the decision.78  But there was 
also anxiety about Japan’s influence to shape the course of TPP 
negotiations:  
Tempering the positive survey results for Mr. Abe, however, the 
poll also showed that support for actually joining the TPP trade 
 
 
procurement policy, patents and copyright policy, and other non-trade issues. The draft pact 
also includes NAFTA-style foreign investor rules that facilitate job offshoring by removing 
many of the risks and costs of relocating U.S. production to low-wage countries. Among TPP 
negotiating countries is Vietnam, the lower-cost offshoring alternative to China. 
Press Release, Public Citizen, With No Text Agreed for Several Entire Chapters and Most Tough 
Political Decisions Unresolved, the So-Called ‘Final Round’ of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Talks 
Will Not Be the End of Negotiations (Aug. 21, 2013) (available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
press-release-tpp-round-19.pdf). 
 74. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Moves to Enter Talks on Pacific Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/japan-aims-to-join-trans-pacific-partnership-talks.html 
?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. It appears that Japan may get agricultural concessions from the United States as part of 
the price for Japanese participation.   
 77. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Statement by Acting U.S. Trade Representative 
Demetrios Marantis on Japan’s Announcement Regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Mar. 15. 
2013) (available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/march/amb-marantis 
-statement-japan-tpp).  
 78. Paul Jackson & Toko Sekiguchi, Support for Abe Grows in Japan, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 
2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323415304578367751057274398.html.  
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pact, not just the talks, is lower at 53%, compared with 23% against 
participation, as voters still wonder if the prime minister can secure 
terms that will favor Japan. More respondents said he would be 
unable to achieve favorable terms, at 40%, than those who said he 
could, at 39%.79  
II. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN-CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS 
Each of the participants in the TPP brings its own agenda. However, 
those of the United States and Japan are particularly strategic in the sense 
that they mean to use the TPP not just for economic purposes, but also to 
further political and regulatory objectives at the international level. While 
the Japanese and U.S. agendas share some similarities, they are 
sufficiently distinct to merit separate consideration. Both strategic 
agendas, however, are directed against China as a common target, even as 
they also focus on the construction of a harmonized global architecture for 
economic activity that crosses borders.   
The Japanese see the TPP as a counterweight to recent aggressive 
Chinese efforts to take the lead in determining the scope and shape of 
bilateral and multilateral relationships in the Pacific. Japanese goals are 
both economic and strategic.80 But perhaps more important is the way 
these objectives can be furthered through the TPP project. Among the 
most important of these—the value of which is sometimes 
underestimated—is the ability of Japan to use TPP as a driver of domestic 
reform.81 TPP’s strategic value lies in its use for refining the basic nature 
of Japan’s relationship with China and the United States, but in unequal 
 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Hiroko Tabuchi describes this nicely: 
Japan also sees a leadership role in the partnership as a way to return to center stage after 
being eclipsed in the region by the rise of China, which many in Tokyo view as jeopardizing 
Japan’s economic interests and security. China, which is pursuing its own bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements in the region, is unlikely to join the agreement soon because of 
the concessions on state-owned enterprises, intellectual property and labor that the pact would 
require. That has, in effect, made the partnership a vehicle of sorts for the United States, and 
now Japan, to counter China’s influence. 
Tabuchi, supra note 75.  
 81. For example, it has been noted that: 
[T]he TPP will lower tariff rates on goods and liberalize Japan’s services sector, which 
constitutes 72 percent of Japan’s GDP. The TPP will also eliminate many nontariff barriers—
behind the border regulations that act as barriers to trade. These measures will lead to greater 
competition which should increase the productivity of the Japanese economy, improving its 
competitiveness, including in its export sector and boosting GDP. 
Meltzer, supra note 14. 
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ways. To China, the Prime Minister offers a Japanese framework for 
framing China-Japan relations, which is referred to as the policy of a 
“mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”82 
But that is tempered by the effects of what Japan sees as the core of its 
strategic relationship with the United States. That core of the relationship 
is grounded in a shared effort to maintain superiority in setting the terms 
of the economic, social, and political rules of the game that will support 
globalization and the relationships among states. Yet this relationship also 
requires an economically and militarily strong Japan. Thus, the Prime 
Minister has emphasized that “Japan’s relations with China stand out as 
among the most important.”83 However, he offers a deeper relationship 
with the United States, one grounded in coherent and mutually reinforcing 
development. “In order for us, Japan and the United States, to jointly 
provide the region and the world with more rule of law, more democracy, 
more security and less poverty, Japan must stay strong.”84 Yet all of these 
goals are closely aligned with the broader strategic objectives of the 
Japanese government, only one of which directly touches on trade. 
The importance of a successfully concluded TPP cannot be 
underestimated. Commentators already note that  
The TPP aims to be the 21st century trade agreement that sets the 
rules for trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region going 
forward. Achieving this goal will require other major economies in 
the Asia-Pacific region to join the agreement with the intention of 
the TPP ultimately becoming a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-
Pacific (FTAAP), and Japan’s participation in the TPP will give 
added momentum towards this goal.85 
Participation in TPP is the instrument that might define the parameters 
of trade within the Pacific basin. The value of that exercise may be of 
enough strategic importance to Japan to make economic concessions 
worthwhile. In this respect, Japan’s position is very much like that of 
 
 
 82. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint Statement between the 
Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive 
Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” (May 7, 
2008) (available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html). These are based on 
five pillars: “enhancement of mutual trust,” “promotion of people-to-people . . . exchange[s],” 
“enhancement of mutually beneficial cooperation,” “contribution to the Asia Pacific region” for 
political stability, and “contribution to the resolution of global issues.” Id. 
 83. Abe, supra note 10. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Meltzer, supra note 14. 
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Norway86 and other small powerful states, but effectuated in different 
ways. The object is to use internationalization both as a means of 
leveraging power for states like Japan and Norway, as well as to temper 
the ability of the most powerful states, like the United States and China, to 
act unilaterally. Undertaken through its sovereign wealth fund, Norway is 
seeking not merely to project public wealth into private global markets, 
but also to construct a complex rule-of-law-centered framework that 
blends the imperatives of a state-based public policy with a rules-based 
governance system that incorporates domestic and international norms.87 
In a similar way, Japan is now seeking to use its participation in the TPP 
to leverage its power to help shape the architecture of transnational 
economic transactions. But Japan may also be using TPP participation as a 
means of reverse leveraging by making concessions in some areas to 
protect against a larger group of states whose key sectors have a 
substantial effect on Japanese internal politics. Among the most important 
of these, of course, is the agricultural sector. Reports in August 2013, on 
the eve of the Nineteenth Round of TPP negotiations, suggested this 
negotiating strategy by Japan.88 
The U.S. objectives are not entirely straightforward, though in large 
part they are not surprising. One commentator suggested what might be 
American strategic objectives.89 These include building the regional trade 
architecture in the Pacific basin, opening export markets, and building an 
alliance network around China.90 These goals parallel Japanese objectives 
 
 
 86. See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Legislative 
Power: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, (Consortium for Peace & Ethics, 
Working Paper No. 2012-11/11, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177778. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Reports from Japan provides some specifics: 
Japan plans to reserve decision on whether to remove tariffs on about 940 items whose tariffs 
have never been eliminated, the sources said. Japanese representatives are not expected to 
discuss these items during the meeting in Brunei. They include 586 items of agricultural 
products in the “five important sectors”: rice; barley and wheat; dairy products; beef and 
pork; and sweetening resource crops. 
Tomoya Fujita & Yuriko Suzuki, Japan to Propose Lifting Tariffs on 85% of Items Under TPP, but 
Not Farm Produce,  ASAHI SHIMBUN (Aug. 19, 2013), https://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/ 
AJ201308190064. 
 89. Chen-Dong Tso, Trans Pacific Partnership and China-Japan-Korea FTA: Implications for 
Taiwan, STIMSON CENTER (Dec. 12, 2012) http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Trans_Pacific_ 
Partnership_and_China_Japan_Korea_FTA.pdf. Tso is the Executive director, Centre for China 
Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. 
 90. Id. at 1–2. Others have noted the importance of the economic considerations: “Japan’s 
participation in the TPP is also of economic significance for the U.S. Without Japan’s participation in 
the TPP the market access opportunities for the U.S. are limited because the U.S. has FTAs with six of 
the 10 TPP parties.” Meltzer, supra note 14. 
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in joining TPP negotiations.91 Together, these objectives/goals would build 
a set of double walls around China. The first is military, and centers on the 
creation of a ring of security arrangements of various sorts around China. 
The second is economic, and aimed at creating a ring of multilateral and 
bilateral trade arrangements around China that set the economic rules of 
the game in a way that reflects the preferences of TPP states. More 
importantly, TPP would add a layer of control to the discourse of 
international trade regulation that would make it harder for the Chinese to 
participate effectively in moving the regulatory environment to better align 
it with its own objectives.  
Yet TPP efforts are not meant simply to target powerful developing 
states like China while developing a trade and economic policy template. 
The TPP framework would provide the United States and its partners with 
a substantially more powerful and comprehensive structure through which 
to pressure other states to conform their behavior to TPP standards. One 
commentator noted: 
China wants to lead the effort to integrate Asia’s economies through 
ASEAN + 3. Beijing is not asking for binding commitments with 
labor and environmental standards, and some Southeast Asian 
nations find this more palatable. But it also sets a low trajectory and 
puts Asian markets out of step with Europe and the United States. In 
the long run, Asian nations interested in making the jump out of the 
middle-income trap will move toward TPP, and China will realize 
TPP presents more of an opportunity than a threat.92 
In effect, TPP would serve the important secondary purpose of 
coercing weaker non-TPP states to conform to TPP standards as a 
condition for trading with TPP states. For instance, TPP states could 
require non-TPP trading partners to agree to conform to TPP standards as 
a condition of entering into bilateral agreements.93 This “imposition 
model” is already in use in efforts to shape a comprehensive financial 
markets governance structure through the standard-setting role of the 
 
 
 91. See discussion above and note especially the policy drivers identified in Abe, supra note 10. 
 92. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE EVOLVING ECONOMIC PICTURE 
IN ASIA: A CONVERSATION WITH ERNEST Z. BOWER, MEREDITH BROADBENT, AND MATTHEW P. 
GOODMAN, GLOBAL FORECAST 2012 44, 45 (discussion by Ernest Z. Bower), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_bower_goodman_broadbent.pdf.  
 93. Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, What’s Wrong With TPP, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp (last updated Feb. 24, 2014).  
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Financial Stability Board.94 That strategy is sufficiently evidenced through 
the side negotiations attendant on the TPP rounds,95 and the bilateral 
negotiations built into the TPP talks.96 But having committed to retaining a 
global leadership role in setting the terms of the architecture of 
globalization, the United States has also increased both the risk that the 
TPP negotiations will fail, and the costs to the United States of a failure to 
successfully conclude the TPP negotiations successfully.97 As one 
commentator noted,  
The TPP is a game-changer, economically and diplomatically. If it 
fails, the recent ‘pivot’ to Asia will be seen as military in nature and 
America’s value as a friend or ally would be high only in case of 
potential conflict. The U.S. should conclude and implement a high-
quality agreement as soon as possible.98  
 
 
 94. See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The 
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2011). 
 95. For example, immediately before the Nineteenth TPP Round:  
Acting Deputy United States Trade Representative Wendy Cutler will visit Tokyo August 7-9 
to lead bilateral negotiations with Japan on autos, insurance, and non-tariff measures being 
held in parallel to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks. While in Tokyo, she also plans to 
meet with her Japanese counterparts to discuss the overall TPP negotiations.  
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Wendy Cutler 
to Visit Japan, Initiate Bilateral Negotiations on Autos, Insurance, Non-Tariff Measures (July 31, 
2013) (available at http://www.ustr.gov/acting-deputy-ustr-wendy-cutler-to-visit-japan-initiate-
bilateral-negotiations-on%20autos-insurance-non-tariff-measures). Even more interesting have been 
the intensification of relations with Vietnam through the TPP framework. See, e.g., Press Release, 
Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States Advances Trans-Pacific Partnership Goals With Vietnam 
(Apr. 24, 2013) (available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/april/US-
advances-TPP-goals-Vietnam).  
 96. See, e.g., Kyodo News International, Bilateral Sessions Continue as Ministers Seek Progress 
in TPP Talks, GLOBAL POST (Aug. 22, 2013, 11:45 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/ 
kyodo-news-international/130823/bilateral-sessions-continue-ministers-seek-progress-tp.  
 97. As one commentator put it near the end of 2013, 
But it is the TPP that really matters most to U.S. trade policy.  Much time, effort, and 
credibility have been invested in the TPP negotiations—the economic arm of the 
administration’s “pivot” to Asia.  If TPP fails to produce a comprehensive, ambitious 
agreement, the economic and diplomatic consequences will be far reaching.  Not only would 
a U.S. reputation already sullied by scandal, equivocation and hypocrisy slip further, but an 
alternative model for economic integration in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region driven by 
Chinese priorities would emerge to fill the void. 
Dan Ikenson, The President's Indifference Imperils the Trans-Pacific Partnership, FORBES (Dec. 6, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2013/12/06/the-presidents-indifference-imperils-the-
trans-pacific-partnership/2/.  
 98. Derek Scissors, What a Good Trans-Pacific Partnership Looks Like, HERITAGE FOUND. 
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/what-a-good-trans-pacific-partner 
ship-looks-like.  
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The risk of failure is very real. The United States failed to push forward 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas. It has not been able to move the 
Doha Round of WTO negotiations to a successful conclusion, and it faces 
substantial opposition to these sorts of trade pacts domestically, an 
opposition that is likely to grow given the comprehensive nature of TPP.99 
Yet even failure may move trade pact forms forward, if only to be driven 
further down into individual bilateral arrangements, for example.  
This strategic objective makes the inclusion of Japan within the TPP 
framework critically important, especially because alongside Japan, the 
United States can also leverage authority in Asia to build a comprehensive 
trade platform.100 But it also underlines the thinking behind U.S. efforts to 
bring the Republic of Korea into the TPP orbit as well.101 Thus, leverage 
grounded in the control of an internationalized discourse can be as 
essential to the strongest states as it is for smaller states seeking to amplify 
power. Xiangfeng Yang has suggested that even within a system of the 
decline of a unipolar power, one that might describe the position of the 
United States in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United 
States may well be able to sustain its leadership position among its allies, 
secure their allegiance, and extract resources from them.102 
Interestingly, one of the most profound strategic implications of the 
methodologies used to negotiate the TPP, especially within the democratic 
state members, is the way in which it has shifted the locus of engagement 
and accountability from a focus on the relationship between citizens and 
their governments to one much more transnational in character in which 
the individual citizen has been de-centered from the channels of 
 
 
 99. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, The Trans Pacific Partnership Is in Trouble on Capitol Hill: Here’s 
Why, WASH. POST FIX BLOG (Feb. 19, 2014, 2:55 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/02/19/why-the-trans-pacific-partnership-is-in-trouble-on-capitol-hill/.  
 100. See Mireya Solis, Japan’s Big Bet on the Trans Pacific Partnership: The TPP Nations 
Should Reciprocate, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/ 
2013/03/25-transpacific-partnership-solis. 
 101. But later accession comes with a price—no participation in the construction of TPP rules. 
“‘There’s no formal deadline,’ Acting U.S. Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis said at a press 
conference for foreign journalists in Washington. ‘The idea is that if economies aren’t ready right now, 
that they’ll be able to join once it’s done and essentially accede to the TPP.’” Lee Chi-dong, No 
Deadline for S. Korea to Decide on TPP Talks: USTR Chief, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/03/21/26/0301000000AEN20130321000200315F .HTML.  
 102. Xiangfeng Yang, What Can China’s Past Tell Us About America’s Future? (APSA 2011 
Annual Meeting Paper 29), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901965 (“elongated unipolarity is 
both possible and feasible, but it is predicated upon a robust inter-state hierarchical authority structure 
with the hegemon at the top.”). 
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accountability.103 In less abstract terms, this means that the old dynamics 
of mass mobilization within states meant to influence legislators holding 
governmental power along with exercise of voting power has been 
rendered less relevant by a system in which the legislative power has 
moved up to the transnational level and is exercised there on behalf of 
national legislatures by the executive power of the state.  While it is true 
enough that national legislatures will have some sort of approval power,104 
national legislatures have effectively been excluded from the negotiation 
process itself,105 which is being conducted in a representative capacity by 
the trade ministers of participating states. Likewise, mass mobilization is 
now dependent on transnational civil society actors, the only organizations 
that can match the transnational power of the states negotiating the 
agreement.106 And more importantly, it shifts the arenas in which large 
global economic actors now seek to manage their engagements with 
governance regimes.107 The democratic deficit has now come to 
comprehensive trade pacts beyond the European Union.108 The TPP will 
not only change the shape of trade and trade relations, but it will also 
 
 
 103. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Democracy Part XXVI: Democratic Accountability—From 
Voter to Managed Mob, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (June 3, 2012), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot 
.com/2012/06/democracy-part-xxvi-democratic.html. 
 104. See, e.g., Vicki Needham, Froman: Obama ‘Ready to Engage’ With Congress on Fast Track, 
HILL ON MONEY BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1005-trade/307503-
president-ready-to-engage-with-congress-on-fast-track.  
 105. “Congress itself hasn’t heard much about the TPP; the negotiating process has been 
characterized by extreme secrecy and the Obama administration has denied repeated calls from 
legislators to make the process more transparent, while pressing to finalize the agreement this year.” 
Zoë Carpenter, Keeping a Massive Trade Deal Out of the Fast Lane, NATION BLOG (Aug. 22, 2013),  
http://www.thenation.com/blog/175865/keeping-massive-trade-deal-out-fast-lane#. A group of 
Peruvian legislators have also sought greater transparency in TPP negotiations. Mike Palmedo, 
Peruvian Legislators File Motion Seeking Public Debate on the Trans Pacific Partnership, 
INFOJUSTICE (Sept. 4, 2013), http://infojustice.org/archives/30645 (noting also a similar Chilean 
legislative effort).  To that end they have filed a motion which in part requests the Foreign Minister 
and the Peruvian TPP team report to the Peruvian legislature.  See Moción de Orden del Día No. 8067, 
29 de agosto de 2013 (Peru), http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/TraDocEstProc/Contdoc02_2011_ 
2.nsf/d99575da99ebfbe305256f2e006d1cf0/9bf1d1955d167e2805257bd60078d3ca/$FILE/MC080672
90813.pdf.  
 106. See, e.g., Rep. of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, 
transmitted by letter dated June 7, 2004 from the Chair of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United 
Nations–Civil Society Relations addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General 8, U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 
11, 2004) (“citizens increasingly act politically by participating directly, through civil society 
mechanisms, in policy debates that particularly interest them. This constitutes a broadening from 
representative to participatory democracy.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Needham, supra note 104 . 
 108. See, e.g., Democratic Deficit, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/ 
democratic_deficit_en.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). See Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the 
Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603 
(2002), available  at http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/deficit.pdf.  
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change the shape of the governance structures of many TPP states, 
including the United States. These states may move closer to an EU 
model, in which the logic of globalization will effectively transfer 
governance power up from out of member states to the governance 
institutions of supranational organizations or the norms developed 
therein.109 
Commentators have also identified some of the principal consequences 
of TPP from the Chinese perspective. Yang suggests that rule making 
competition and access to U.S. markets as the two principal effects of TPP 
expansion on China.110 He notes that China has not yet settled on a 
response to the potential threat posed by TPP. He identifies two schools of 
thought.111 The first sees TPP as a potential threat, but discounts the 
effects of TPP principally because they do not believe that the conflicting 
interests of the parties will permit much coherence or discipline.112 
Another group sees TPP as an opportunity for Chinese expansion rather 
than as a means of containment. This expansion is to be realized by such 
projects as the newly established Shanghai Free Trade Zone.113  
In either case, China is particularly sensitive to any action or policy 
that can be understood as fostering Chinese containment. To that end, 
China is seeking to resist policies that might produce containment to the 
advantage of its trade competitors. More importantly, China is also 
seeking to avoid containment through its own trade strategies. These 
 
 
 109. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant: Four Perspectives on 
the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141 (2006). 
 110. Tso, supra note 89, at 3–4.   
 111. Id. at 4–5 and sources cited. Xiangyang Li (李向陽), Kuà Tàipíngyáng Huǒbàn Guānxì 
Xiédìng: Zhōngguó Juéqǐ Guòchéng de Zhòngdà Tiǎozhàn (跨太平洋伙 
伴关系协定:中国崛起过程中的重大挑战) [Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Major Challenge to 
China’s Rise], GUÓJÌ JĪNGJÌ PÍNGLÙN (國際經濟評論) [INT’L ECON. REV.], Iss. 2 (2012); Yunling 
Zhang (張蘊嶺), Měiguó Zhǔdǎo Fàn Tàipíngyáng Xuéyì Duì Zhōngguó de Yǐngxiǎng (美國主導泛太平 
洋夥伴協議對中國的影響) [Impact of U.S.-Led Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement on China], JĪNGJÌ 
YÁNJIŪ CĀNKǍO (經濟研究參考) [REV. ECON. RES.], Iss. 1 (2012). Tso argues that TPP is in China’s 
long term interests and that indeed China should seek to join TPP. See Tso, supra note 89, at 10. 
 112. One ought to recall the difficulty of multilateral trade negotiations in general. See, e.g., 
GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 52–56 (1992) 
(description of difficulty of trade agreement negotiation). 
 113. See He Wei & Wei Tian, Time of Opportunities, Challenges, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-09/13/content_16966598.htm (“Experts say the FTZ also 
represents a counter-challenge to other recent developments such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
This US-led initiative is widely seen as a move to curtail China’s growing influence on global trade. 
Wei Jianguo, secretary-general of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, said the 
partnership could be seen as the first step toward establishing an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Zone. As 
such, he said China could take the initiative in joining it to maximize the benefits for the region as a 
whole.”).    
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include expanding FTA-type relations within the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) group, strengthening trade with Canada, and 
aggressively pursuing FTA agreements with Japan and Korea.114 Chinese 
military arrangements are also growing through the Shanghai Cooperation 
Group and similar strategies.115 This may be a harder policy to 
operationalize now as China begins its transition to status as a developed 
state, and with it a substantially higher cost of labor and a switch in the 
mix of industrial production.  
The shift—illustrated in weakened foreign investment in China—
has pluses and minuses for an economy key to global growth. 
Beijing wants to shift to higher-value production and to see incomes 
rise. But a de-emphasis on manufacturing puts pressure on leaders 
to make sure jobs are created in other sectors to keep the world's 
No. 2 economy humming.116  
But that may matter less as investment increasingly becomes internally 
generated in China.117 Concern over China’s growing military power may 
also drive its neighbors to establish alliances with the United States, as 
demonstrated by Vietnam.118  
But the issues run much deeper than economic policy for China. The 
fear of encirclement runs deep in Chinese strategic thinking, whether that 
encirclement is military, economic, or related to governance.119 Official 
Chinese media sources speak to these fears:  
 
 
 114. WINHAM, supra note 112, at 5–6. ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
includes many of the TTP participants. See ASEAN Member States, ASEAN, http://www.asean.org/ 
asean/asean-member-states (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
 115. See, e.g., SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, www.sectsco.org/EN123/ (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2014). 
 116. Yayun Zhang, China Begins to Lose Edge as World’s Factory Floor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323783704578245241751969774.html. 
 117. Id. (“With the lion’s share of investment in China now coming from domestic sources, the 
impact of falling foreign investment on growth will be limited. But an erosion of manufacturing’s 
importance underlines the challenge for China’s leaders in finding new sources of growth in domestic 
consumption and higher-level industry.”). 
 118. See, e.g., JAMES BELLACQUA, CNA CHINA STUDIES, THE CHINA FACTOR IN U.S.-VIETNAM 
RELATIONS (2012), available at http://www.cna.org/research/2012/china-factor-us-vietnam-relations;  
John Roberts, The U.S.-Vietnam Alliance Against China, AXIS OF LOGIC (July 30, 2013), 
http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_65866.shtml (citing John Roberts, Vietnam’s President 
Visits White House, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE (July 30, 2013), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/ 
2013/07/30/veus-j30.html). 
 119. Larry Catá Backer, Encircling China or Embedding It?, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 
8, 2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/encircling-china.html.  
For a considerable period of time, Chinese officials have been focusing on the possibility that 
the United States intends to surround it to prevent it from more forcefully asserting its own 
interests in the region. Echoing similar concerns of the Russians, the Chinese suggest that 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
74 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:49 
 
 
 
 
On a strategic level, Washington wants Southeast Asia to form the 
center of an “Asian strategic alliance” that includes Northeast Asia, 
Southeast Asia and India. On a political level, the US continues to 
export “democracy” and Western values to Southeast Asian 
countries. On the economic level, the US has close ties with 
Southeast Asia in terms of trade, finance and investment and 
considers the latter an important overseas market, resource supplier 
and investment destination. At a military and security level, the US 
wants to set up more military bases and positively interfere in 
security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region.120 
The need to avoid American encirclement is particularly acute for the 
Chinese when it comes to the building of a governance web through rules 
of global engagement. The latter point was brought home in Hu Jintao’s 
Report to the Eighteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress in November 
2012. He highlighted a Chinese policy objective of projecting power 
beyond economics to the fields of international regulatory development 
and made it clear that China intends to have a greater say in what global 
rules are going to be:  
We will actively participate in multilateral affairs, support the 
United Nations, G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
BRICS and other multilateral organizations in playing an active role 
in international affairs, and work to make the international order and 
system more just and equitable. We will take solid steps to promote 
public diplomacy as well as people-to-people and cultural 
exchanges, and protect China's legitimate rights and interests 
overseas.121 
 
 
American policy has been to engage China economically while creating an effective military 
encirclement that would enhance the American position in the event of conflict. 
Id.  
 120. Li Bing, Time to Counter US Ploys, XINHUANET (July 29, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet 
.com/english2010/indepth/2010-07/29/c_13420374.htm. Related fears were repeated to the press in 
2013. “Ding Gang, a well-known journalist for the People’s Daily, who specialises in international 
affairs, commented ‘the US does not want to be squeezed out of the Asia-Pacific region by China. The 
(TPP) is superficially an economic agreement but contains an obvious political purpose to constrain 
China’s rise.’” Toh, supra note 30.  
 121. Hu Jintao, Report to the 18th Chinese Communist Party National Congress, Section XI (Nov. 
17, 2012) (translation available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-
11/17/c_131981259_12.htm). “The BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, and China] idea was first conceived in 
2001 by Goldman Sachs as part of an economic modeling exercise to forecast global economic trends 
over the next half century.” About BRICS, FIFTH BRICS SUMMIT (Mar. 2013), http://www.brics5 
.co.za/about-brics/ (“BRIC Foreign Ministers at their meeting in New York on 21st September 2010 
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It is in this light that one can understand the more energetic approach of 
Chinese participation both in ASEAN and in seeking to procure free trade 
agreements within the Asia Pacific Basin. These agreements are designed 
to reconfigure the basic operating rules of international trade and national 
engagement, one that substantially protects its state-owned enterprises and 
permits it a certain latitude with its program of sovereign investing.122 
This, of course, is something that influential policy makers in the United 
States oppose as a basis for ordering the framework of global trade.123 It is 
also important to understand that China, like the United States, is painting 
with a broader brush. 
Just as the United States may have Latin American and African trade in 
mind as it works through a TPP template, China may well have the BRICS 
and Africa in mind as it seeks to find supporters for an alternative structure 
for framing trade.124 Additionally, China may be looking to expand its 
influence in the construction of soft law, a critical component of the 
emerging structures of global law.125 China appears ready to participate in 
the development of customary practices and governance standards within 
soft law frameworks of international organizations and private 
 
 
agreed that South Africa may be invited to join BRIC. Accordingly, South Africa was invite to attend 
the 3rd BRICS Summit in Sanya on 14 April 2011.”)  
 122. Larry Catá Backer, Michael Komesaroff on Chinese Investments in Afghanistan and the 
Changing Face of Global Mining, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Mar. 17, 2013), http://lcbackerblog 
.blogspot.com/2013/03/michael-komesaroff-on-chinese.html.  
 123. Robert Zoellick recently argued: 
The increased importance of SOEs in the world economy—in financial services, 
telecommunications, steel, chemicals and energy, and other natural resources—requires new 
rules so that private businesses can compete fairly with state capitalism. The rules need not 
push privatisation or rollbacks of state enterprises, but they should require transparency, 
commercial behaviour, declarations of subsidies, nondiscrimination and open procurement. 
Robert Zoellick, Opinion, Questions for the World’s Next Trade Chief, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5f9f5ece-923a-11e2-851f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2PGbI4Atv.  
 124. See Xinhua, Chinese President Participates In BRICS Leaders-Africa Dialogue Forum, 
QIUSHI (Mar. 27, 2013), http://english.qstheory.cn/news/201303/t20130328_219352.htm.  
Chinese President Xi Jinping and leaders of the other major emerging economies met a group 
of African leaders in Durban, South Africa, Wednesday to discuss cooperation between the 
BRICS nations and Africa. . . . Xi said the world cannot enjoy stability and prosperity without 
the peace and development of Africa and international affairs cannot be properly dealt with 
without Africa’s participation, adding that the global governance system would lose vitality 
without Africa’s saying. BRICS and African countries are like-minded friends with extensive 
common interests, he said, noting that the rising of Africa brings opportunities to BRICS 
countries, likewise, the development of BRICS countries brings opportunities to the 
continent. 
Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview, in BEYOND 
TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 87–123 
(Günther Handl, Joachim Zekoll & Peer Zumbansen Eds., 2012). 
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enterprises.126 It is willing to put up substantial amounts of money to make 
good on its efforts to increase its influence in all organizations that help 
shape international discourse on rules. “‘China is doing it to increase its 
say; it’s playing the part of investor in many international organizations in 
the hope of being able to formulate things, even rewrite the rules of the 
game,’ Mr. Ye was quoted as saying.”127 
Indeed, Wen Jin Yuan notes the sense among Chinese academic and 
policy circles that “the main reason behind the Obama Administration’s 
support for the TPP agenda is the US’s desire to use the TPP as a tool to 
economically contain China’s rise.”128 Wen notes, for example, reports 
published in the People’s Daily, the official organ of the Chinese 
Communist Party, that refer to TPP as “superficially an economic 
agreement but contain[ing] an obvious political purpose to constrain 
China’s rise.”129 More importantly, a successfully negotiated TPP would 
result, according to other Chinese scholars, in trade diversion to the 
detriment of Chinese economic interests.130 Yet, according to Wen’s 
research, United States officials insist that the ultimate goal of the United 
States was not containment, but incorporation. The “U.S.’s ultimate goal is 
to integrate China into this regional trade system, rather than keeping 
China out, and the TPP initiative is actually similar to the strategy led by 
several U.S. agencies to incorporate China into the WTO system.”131 Yet 
incorporation can be understood from the Chinese side as another form of 
containment. Rather than have China lead a new effort at refining the rules 
and culture of trade in the Pacific, it would be forced to participate as a 
 
 
 126. “We will give further play to the role of trade associations. In recent years, MOFCOM has 
been committed to establishing China-funded enterprises associations or chambers of commerce in the 
key investment countries, and standardizing the companies’ behavior in the local investment.” Press 
Release, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM: Further Enhancing CSR Awareness of Chinese 
Companies Operating Abroad, Sino-Swedish Corporate Social Responsibility Cooperation (Mar. 19, 
2013) (available at http://csr2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/cooperation/201303/20130300059556.shtml).  
 127. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, BRIC, BRICS or BRICSI? The Growing Challenge, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB. RENDEZVOUS BLOG (Mar. 31, 2013), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/first-
bric-then-brics-now-bricsi-the-world-financial-orders-challenge/. “As the leaders of the BRICS nations 
met in South Africa this week and announced they would establish a development bank to help fund 
five-year infrastructure investment sums, plans for a financial ‘safety net,’ or reserve, and a string of 
councils to add business and intellectual heft to the group, some are wondering if Indonesia should be 
in.” Id. (quoting in part Xia Yeliang, an economics professor at Peking University).  
 128. WEN JIN YUAN, CSIS FREEMAN BRIEFING: THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AND CHINA’S 
CORRESPONDING STRATEGIES 2–4 (June 20, 2012), http://csis.org/files/publication/120620_Freeman_ 
Brief.pdf.  
 129. Id. at 2 (citing Ding Gang & Ji Peijuan, Mei Licu Fan Taipingyang Huoban Guanxi [The US 
Attaches Great Importance to the Pan-Pacific Partnership], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (July 
27, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-07/27/c_121725596.htm).  
 130. Id. at 5. 
 131. Id. at 4.  
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junior partner in a regulatory exercise directed by the United States and its 
principal ally, Japan. For the Chinese, the substantial effect might well be 
understood as containment, though that view/perception is lost on the 
United States.132 
As a consequence, Wen argues, Chinese policy will continue to push 
its own trade agenda as a means of countering the perceived political and 
economic effects of TPP on its interests. First among its strategies will be 
an acceleration of its efforts to secure free trade agreements with its 
neighbors.133 To the extent that these then hamper further TPP 
negotiations, all the better.134 A possible consequence would be trade and 
regulatory system competition, as the United States and China fight for 
control of the discourse of trade rules, with the objective measured by the 
participation of the Pacific Basin’s most important economies. A March 
21, 2013, report noted,  
Following Japan’s recent announcement that it will join in 
negotiations of the US-led Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership (TPP), the US and China are picking up the pace in 
staking their claims on Asian economic territory. The US is 
encouraging South Korea to join in the TPP, which has pressured 
China into spurring discussions of a trilateral free trade agreement 
(FTA) between China, Japan, and South Korea.135  
More importantly, China will accelerate the creation of its own 
enhanced free trade area, one in which it will play the dominant role. 
China is “also putting work into the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), which would include not only China, 
Japan, and South Korea but also the ten countries in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with India, Australia, and New 
 
 
 132. Backer, supra note 119. 
 133. YUAN, supra note 128, at 6.  
 134. However, it should be noted that internal Chinese politics may make these agreements easier 
to speak about than to negotiate. FTAs require cooperation among a number of ministries within 
China, some of which are not known for sharing the same views. See id. at 8–9.  
 135. Park Hyun, Seong Yeon-cheol & Lee Jeong-hun, US Hoping South Korea Will Join Trans-
Pacific Partnership, HANKYOREH (Mar. 21, 2013), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/ 
e_international/579052.html.  
At a Korea Society lecture in New York on Mar. 19 (EST), Assistant US Trade 
Representative for Korea, Japan and APEC Affairs Wendy Cutler said, “We believe that 
Korea could be a natural member of the TransPacific Partnership negotiations. We look 
forward to continuing our working relationship with Korea and keeping them updated” . . . . 
In response, China is pulling out all the stops in pursuit of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA.  
Id.  
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Zealand.”136 There is irony here: the Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership for East Asia (“CEPEA”) is a Japanese-led proposal for trade 
cooperation and free trade agreement among the sixteen present member 
countries of the East Asia Summit.137 
Second, according to Jianmin Jin, would be the encirclement and 
containment of Japan and the constraining of U.S. influence in the region, 
especially for setting the terms of trade policy. Jianmin Jin “groups 
China’s current and potential FTA partners into four different categories: 
(1) greater China economic region (four cross-strait regions: mainland 
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau); (2) surrounding regions (ASEAN, 
Pakistan); (3) resource-rich regions (GCC, Australia); and (4) developed 
countries (Switzerland, etc.).”138 Jin suggests that “as the central country 
tying together the China-Japan-South Korea FTA and the TPP, Japan 
should not choose between the two, but balance them with each other.”139 
Japan is likely to engage in this tactic, but it is clear that given Prime 
Minister Abe’s recent remarks about the ties with the United States, and 
the congruence of Japanese and U.S. military and economic interests, 
Japan’s balancing may be skewed toward greater reliance on TPP. It might 
follow that Japan would see any Chinese free trade agreement, or 
additional multilateral trade arrangements, as a means of protecting its 
interests in China, at least in the short run.  
Third, the short run ends when China is itself invited to join TPP. As 
such, Chinese policy circles misunderstand one threat of TPP. Chinese 
analysts correctly perceive the threat of TPP in terms of its ability to 
 
 
 136. Id. For a Japanese perspective on CEPEA, see Risaburo Nezu, Why CEPEA Makes Sense to 
Asia, FUJITSU RES. INST. (Apr. 9, 2010), http://jp.fujitsu.com/group/fri/en/column/economic-topics/ 
2010/2010-04-09.html. 
 137. The CEPEA proposal was advanced by Japan in conjunction with the establishment of the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). The two mechanisms are designed to 
be mutually supporting liberalization and cooperation. See Mohit Anand, Towards Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership in East Asia, INST. PEACE & CONFLICT STUD. (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.ipcs 
.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2702 (“Japan’s emphasis on such a framework rests on its attempt 
to ensure that prosperity accruing from effective economic integration of East Asia will connect 
Japan’s economy with Asia’s growth.”)  
 138. YUAN, supra note 128, at 7. See also Jianmin Jin, China’s Concerns Regarding TPP No 
More than Empty Worries?, FUJITSU RES. INST. (Jan. 11, 2012), http://jp.fujitsu.com/group/fri/en/ 
column/message/2012/2012-01-11.html. Jin suggests that:  
China takes into account the strategic economic, political, and diplomatic significance of 
FTAs and aims to 1) realize scale merit of economic development, 2) obtain resources 
necessary for its own economic growth, 3) erase the “China Threat” doctrine, 4) suppress 
separate independence movements like ‘“Taiwan Independence”, and 5) improve the 
international environment, especially the surrounding environment. 
Id. 
 139. Jin, supra note 138. 
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change the balance of influence from China to Japan through its American 
alliance. But it is a mistake to think that this change of balance will be 
effectuated through Japanese inclusion and Chinese exclusion from TPP. 
Instead, the United States will seek to contain China through inclusion in 
the disciplinary procedures and structures of the TPP rather than by 
excluding it.140 Perhaps President Obama put it best when he remarked in 
his 2011 meeting with the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
In a larger sense, the TPP has the potential to be a model not only 
for the Asia Pacific but for future trade agreements. It addresses a 
whole range of issues not covered by past agreements, including 
market regulations and how we can make them more compatible, 
creating opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses in the 
growing global marketplace. It will include high standards to 
protect workers’ rights and the environment.141 
The stakes for control might be significant, especially for China. Some 
commentators in the United States see the TPP as a means of managing 
the ability of states, principally China, to blend state and private power 
through state-owned enterprises.142 
Trade policy and the regulatory environment will continue to develop 
as complex overlapping circles of trade regimes, roughly similar, but 
designed to assert strategic regulatory and political objectives in addition 
to economic aims. Indeed, one of the side benefits of the TPP for the 
 
 
 140. According to reports, 
“Whether it’s China, whether it’s the Philippines, whether it’s Thailand . . . it’s incumbent 
upon those economies to be able to convince the other TPP partners that they are capable of 
meeting the high standards that we’re negotiating,” Marantis told reporters from foreign 
media outlets at a briefing on the US trade agenda for 2013.  
Joseph Boris, US Says Trade Talks Are Ajar for China, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-03/21/content_16329114.htm.  
 141. Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in Meeting With 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (Nov. 12, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/speeches/transcripts/2010/november/remarks-president-barack-obama-meeting-tran).  
 142. Derek Scissors, What a Good Trans-Pacific Partnership Looks Like, HERITAGE FOUND. 
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/what-a-good-trans-pacific-partner 
ship-looks-like. Scissors explains: 
[T]he very existence of SOEs should be understood as an effort by governments to limit 
market competition and increase state control in a particular sector. That is: an effort precisely 
to retain sector participants which do not operate on a commercial basis. . . . Where TPP 
member states insist on retaining SOEs, their market share should be capped at as low a level 
as possible, to forestall absurd claims that state firms completely dominate markets due to 
competitive superiority. . . . Because SOEs represent circumscribed competition at home, 
their investments overseas can properly be considered by host countries as different from 
investment by companies that earn commercial profits at home.  
Id. 
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United States is that it might provide a back door method for reviving the 
abandoned Free Trade Area of the Americas by including those states in 
Latin America within the TPP framework.143 Within a global order in 
which the basics of transnational trade is still sometimes contested,144 the 
real prize is influence over the language of control and the development of 
polycentric alignment of states that increasingly work with and compete 
against each other through harmonized and coherent rules frameworks 
designed to provide marginal advantage to their particular national 
circumstances.145 This is something Korea and Japan understand well.146 
CONCLUSION 
Japan remains steadily fixed between the United States and China. 
With the election of Prime Minister Abe, Japan has chosen a middle 
course, but one that pushes it further into the complex entanglements 
between the United States and China. Japan’s decision to participate in 
TPP negotiations drives Japan more closely to the center of current efforts 
to define and control the regulatory structures of trade in the Pacific basin. 
By extension, TPP may also control the shape of legitimate government 
and government policy among TPP states and those who trade with them. 
This represents a closer alignment of Japan with the United States. But it 
represents a threat to the People’s Republic of China as well. That threat is 
direct—representing to the Chinese what may appear as another piece of 
the U.S. strategy to encircle China militarily and economically and to 
isolate it from the center of current efforts to develop transnational 
regulatory structures. To that extent, Japan’s commitment to the TPP 
represents a direct threat to emerging Chinese interests, a threat that China 
will respond to against the United States and Japan.  
 
 
 143. “The TPP is seen in Latin America as a second attempt by the United States to push a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in the region with help from countries whose governments are 
subservient to the U.S. led neoliberal ideology and ‘free trade’ economics.” Burbano et al., supra note 
71.  
 144. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of Alternative 
Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 687, 687–95 
(2010).  
 145. See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st 
Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 177, 177–99 
(2012). 
 146. “South Korea will monitor Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations while it pursues competing 
free trade pacts with Asian partners, but Seoul hopes the various regional trade agreements will one 
day merge, Trade Minister Taeho Bark said on May 16.” South Korea Prioritizes Asia Trade Pacts 
Over Pacific Partnership, ASAHI SHIMBUN (May 17, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/ 
politics/AJ20120517002.  
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Ironically the greater threat is indirect—to the extent that Japan and the 
United States join together under the TPP umbrella and invite China to 
participate as well, China will find itself constrained by the development 
of group norms with respect to which it will be able to participate, but not 
dominate. For Japan, this may represent containment that protects its 
sizeable investment in China, at least temporarily. TPP may also permit 
Japan to leverage its power to influence global trade rules. But it also 
reaffirms that Japan stands uncomfortably close to the fissure that 
separates the United States from Chinese interests, and must continue to 
rely on the internationalization of rulemaking to protect its own interests. 
An independent path for Japan is unlikely to be an option worth 
considering. To a large extent, Zaki Laïdi’s recent suggestion resonates 
well here: “Since the end of the cold war, Europeans have believed deeply 
in the existence of a global commons—and the declining importance of 
national sovereignty. The conduct of both the US and emerging countries 
suggests the opposite. Power politics is back. Multilateralism is dying.”147  
 
 
 147. Laïdi, supra note 46.  
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